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Abstract
On news of a takeover, the sum of the stock-market values of the firms
involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does
this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not
necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers
is constrained eﬃcient. Yet, upon news of a takeover, a target’s price rises,
the bidder’s price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and
acquirer also falls.
1 Introduction
On news of a takeover, the share price of the target firm usually rises sharply, while
that of the acquiring firm usually falls. The joint value may or may not rise. Surveying
the field, Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) report that since 1973 target premia
were 20 or 30 percent, acquirer discounts were minus 3 or 4 percent, and that the joint
value shows no clear pattern. They conclude (p. 118) that “the fact that mergers
do not seem to benefit acquirers provides a reason to worry ...[that mergers do not
raise value].” To explain such evidence Shleifer and Vishny (2001) have assumed that
investors are irrational and Roll (1986) has assumed that managers use takeovers
to extend their empires at the expense of the shareholder. The evidence about the
bidder discount and joint discount has been taken to imply that takeovers often just
redistribute rents from acquirers to their targets or that they even destroy rents.
McCardle and Viswanathan (MV)(1994) oﬀer a model where mergers always lead
to private gains for both parties, and yet where bidder discounts and target premia do
arise. They model a duopoly with one potential entrant whose entry cost is unknown;
the entrant can come in as a third firm, or it can acquire one of the incumbents in
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which case it does not pay the entry cost. A takeover bid reduces the bidder’s stock
price because it signals a high entry cost. The target premium arises because a
takeover signals that the number of producers will be two, not three, so that market
price will be higher.
We add to MV in three ways. First, in a competitive model we show that mergers
are not just privately, but also socially eﬃcient. Second, we derive simple formulas
not just for the discounts and premia, but also for the joint discount which MV do
not deal with. And, third, our analysis seems to cover a much wider body of mergers
because (i) MV do not allow horizontal mergers (the two incumbents would like to
merge, but antitrust prevents this), and yet these account for about half of all mergers
in the 1990s — Andrade et al. (2001, Table 1), (ii) In MV, only one firm has the option
to enter, and yet the recent merger waves in the Airlines and Telecommunications
industries were accompanied by lots of new entry, (iii) Target premia are bigger for
small firms whose disappearance makes little diﬀerence to industry capacity (Akbulut
and Matsusaka 2003), suggesting that imperfect competition has little to do with
explaining target premia.
In contrast to MV, Holmes and Schmitz (1990) have a competitive model in which
good managers acquire firms from good developers of new ideas. They stress, as we
also do, that good projects and good managers are complements in production, but
they do not consider stock-market issues, being interested more in transfers of small
businesses.
Plan of paper.–Section 2 presents the model and examines some of its implica-
tions. Section 3 contains the welfare result. Section 4 discusses some of the key
assumptions and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
At the outset firms diﬀer in the quality, x, of their management. Each firm then
draws a project and the quality, z, of projects, too, diﬀers over firms. Some good
managers end up with bad projects and vice versa. Takeovers then serve to shift the
good projects from bad managers to good managers. A firm’s output is
xz. (1)
Thus the quality of a project, z, and the firm’s ability to implement it, x, are comple-
ments. Among firms, x ≥ 0 is distributed according to the cumulative distribution
function F (x). Projects are either good or useless: z ∈ {0, 1}. A fraction λ of
projects is good, and the fraction 1− λ is useless.
A firm cannot change the quality of its management. It can, however, acquire
another firm and manage its project. A manager can handle only one project. If a
firm (x, z) buys firm (x0, z0), it then uses its own management, x, and the project, z0,
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of the firm that it has acquired. The output of the merged entity will be
xz0. (2)
To an acquirer, then, only the target’s z0 matters. It drops its own, useless project,
and lets go the target’s manager.
Shareholders are risk neutral and they hold on to their shares until the firm pays
its dividend and liquidates or until it is bought by another firm. A manager acts in
the shareholder’s interest: He puts the firm up for sale if (and only if) the payment
exceeds his firm’s stand-alone dividend; he buys another firm if (and only if) net of
the payment, the dividend of the new entity exceeds his firm’s stand-alone dividend.
Events occur in five stages:
1. A continuum of firms forms. Based on its x (which is public knowledge) a firm
sells at p (x) .
2. The firm privately observes z.
3. The firm may enter the takeover market as a buyer or a seller. It can stay out of
the takeover market if it wishes to, i.e., it can repel an unwanted bid.1 If it does
enter the market as a seller, the firm may disclose its z at a cost c. Disclosure
(if any) must be thruthful.
4. The takeover market clears at the price q. This market is Walrasian in that
firms take prices as given and there are no out-of-equilibrium transactions.
5. The firm pays its dividend and liquidates.
2.1 Stage-3 actions and Stage-4 prices
We will show later that unless c is extremely large, the unique equilibrium is one in
which the low-x firms with good projects are taken over by the high-x firms with bad
projects. We illustrate this equilibrium in Figure 1, and describe it below.
Equilibrium.–Key to equilibrium is a pair of real numbers, x0, and x1, where
x0 < x1. These two numbers divide the set of x’s into three regions — top, middle,
and bottom. Targets come from the bottom region, acquirers from the top region.
Firms from the middle region stay out of the takeover market. We start describing
the equilibrium with an account of the Stage-3 actions and Stage-4 prices of the firms
in each region.
The bottom region — x ≤ x0.–If such a firm draws z = 1, it discloses that fact.
This is the North-West region in Figure 1. It becomes a takeover target and sells
1Of all takeover bids, only 8.3% of all bids are hostile and only 4.4% eventually succeed (Andrade
et al., 2001). We do not explain such mergers.
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Figure 1: The initial endowments among firm types
at the price q. All targets sell at the same price. Firm x0 is indiﬀerent between
disclosing z and securing a payoﬀ of q − c, and not disclosing and managing its own
project and securing a payoﬀ of x0. That is,
q − c = x0. (3)
If a firm from this region does not disclose its z, the market rationally infers that it
is a z = 0 firm. The Stage-4 price of such a firm is zero. To sum up, then, in the
bottom region, a firm’s Stage-4 price is q if z = 1, and it is zero if z = 0.
The middle region — x ∈ (x0, x1).–Such a firm does not disclose its z and it does
not bid for other firms. The market infers nothing from its inaction. If such a firm
has z = 1, it can guarantee its shareholders more than q − c, and it would refuse
(and successfully repel) any takeover bid at the price q. If, on the other hand, such a
firm has z = 0, buying another firm at the price q would leave it with a negative net
payoﬀ. Thus, if a firm from this region did not refuse a takeover bid, it would reveal
itself to be a “lemon”. Thus no one bids for firms in this region and their Stage-4
prices, λx, are the same as their Stage-1 prices.
The top region — x ≥ x1.–Acquirers come from this region if they have drawn
z = 0. This is the South-East region in Figure 1. Such a firm buys a discloser from
the first region thereby raising its own output and dividend from zero to x; and its
Stage-4 price is x − q. The lowest-quality bidder x1 is indiﬀerent between bidding
(and getting a payoﬀ of x1− q), and managing its own project (and getting zero), so
that
q = x1. (4)
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Figure 2: How Equilibrium Dividends Depend on x and z
If it does not bid, this signals to the market that the firm’s z = 1, and its Stage-4
price is x. The z = 0 firms could secure a higher Stage-4 price if they refrained from
bidding, but that would deliver a zero dividend to its shareholders who are following
a “buy and hold” strategy. To sum up, then, in the top region, a firm’s Stage-4 price
is x if z = 1, and x− q if z = 0.
Figure 2 shows the shareholders’ equilibrium payoﬀs, which depend on x and on
z. Without takeovers, the z = 1 firms would pay a dividend of x (i.e., the 450 line),
and the z = 0 firms would be paying their shareholders a dividend of zero (i.e., the
horizontal axis). Takeovers make both targets and acquirers strictly better oﬀ.
Market clearing.–The Stage-4 price of the targets, q, must clear the takeover
market, supply of certified targets must equal demand for them:
λF (q − c) = (1− λ) (1− F [q]) . (5)
2.2 Discounts and premia
Discounts and premia are calculated by comparing Stage-4 prices to Stage-1 prices.
Stage-1 prices.–For firms in the middle region the Stage-1 prices are the same as
the Stage-4 prices, namely, λx. In the two other regions, a firm’s Stage-1 price is a
weighted sum of the prices it will fetch at stage 4, the weights being the probabilities
of z being zero and one. The stage-1 prices are:
p (x) =



λ (q − c) if x ≤ x0,
λx if x ∈ (x0, x1) ,
λx+ (1− λ) (x− q) if x ≥ x1.
(6)
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At Stage 4, all targets trade at a premium over their Stage-1 prices, and all bidders
trade at a discount. We measure the premia and discounts as percentages of Stage-1
prices p (x).
The target premium.–From (6), the premium is
(q − c)− p (x)
p (x)
=
(1− λ) (q − c)
λ (q − c) =
1− λ
λ
,
and it is the same for all targets. The target premium is high when good projects are
scarce and when, as a result, a disclosure that z = 1 is especially good news. Target
premia average about 0.2, and so the relevant value seems to be λ ≈ 0.83.
The bidder discount.–Conversely, the bidder discount is high when good projects
are plentiful and when, as a result, the revelation of z = 0 that is implicit in a firm’s
decision to acquire another, is especially bad news. The discount is smaller for the
high-x bidders because all bidders pay the same price, q, but the high-x bidders
benefit more. The absolute value of bidder’s discount, i.e., the fraction of value lost
upon announcement, is
δ (x) ≡ λq
x− (1− λ) q .
From (4) x1 = q, and so δ (x1) = 1; the marginal bidder loses all of his value. As x
rises, the discount steadily shrinks and converges to zero as x gets large.
The values combined.–The target’s x’s do not aﬀect their prices at any stage.
Therefore only the acquirer’s x aﬀects the sum of the two firms’ Stage-1 and Stage-4
prices. Relative to the sum of the two firms’ ex-ante values, the ex-post “joint” value
of the merged firm is
J (x) =
x− c
q (2λ− 1) + (x− λc) , (7)
an expression that is relevant for x ≥ x1 only. The right-hand side of (7) is less than
unity when λ = 1/2 and it is even smaller when λ > 1/2 because q > 0. For λ ≥ 1/2,
the joint values drop:
Proposition 1 (Joint values). For all x > x1,
J (x) < 1 if λ > 1/2. (8)
Proof. By (3) and (4), x > x1 implies that x > c. Condition (8) is seen to be
suﬃcient for the claim. It is not necessary, for it holds for some λ ≤ 1/2 when c > 0.
For λ ≥ 1/2 and any c, J (x) is strictly increasing in x, i.e., the drop is smaller for
the high-x firms. Moreover, J (x) is lower when λ is high. This is because the larger
6
Figure 3: Average cumulative excess returns for 211 targets: 60 days before to 60
days after the press day in the period 1962 to 1976 — Figure 1 of Asquith (1983)
is λ, the bigger (relative to ex-ante beliefs) is the disappointment in a firm that ex
post finds itself in the pool of bidders. 2
2.2.1 The timing of the target premium
In the model, a firm certifies that its z = 1, and then it is taken over. ‘Certification’
is, in fact, the due diligence process which starts several months before the first bid,
and continues after that and until the deal closes. In Figure 3 we reproduce Figure
1 of Asquith (1983) which describes the evolution of the target premium around
the “press date” — the day when the financial press first reports a merger bid. The
horizontal axis is in trading-day units.3 We emphasize the following:
1. Most of the target premium is in place by the press date.
2A referee suggested the following explanation for why J (x) is decreasing in λ: Re-write (7) as
(x− q) + (q − c)
λx+ (1− λ) (x− q) + λ (q − c) + (1− λ) 0 .
The Stage-1 value of a high-x firm is λx+(1− λ) (x− q). When λ is high, this is close to the Stage-4
outcome with no acquisition, i.e., λx. It falls to x− q with acquisition. The Stage-1 value of a low-x
firm is λ (q − c). When λ is high, this is close to the Stage-4 outcome with an acquisition, i.e., q− c.
Thus, when λ is high, the value of the low-x firm rises only a little, whereas the value of the high-x
firm falls by a lot.
3Similar evidence is in (Jensen and Ruback (1984 pp. 14-15), Schwert (1996 esp. Figure 1) and
Andrade et al. (2001 p. 110).
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2. Negotiations go on beyond the first bid up to a year or longer. In deals that
go through (about 2/3 in Asquith’s sample do), targets’ prices rise further, but
for deals that fail, the target’s premium disappears.
In light of our model we would interpret Fact 1 as embodying the market’s reaction
to news about the target’s z that due diligence generates, and that partially leaks out
before the first bid. Most often, disclosure is made privately to the bidder(s) because
none of the parties wants the target’s competitors to learn about the target’s business
plans and trade secrets. (Gray et al. 1990, Table 4). Occasionally, a target discloses
widely so as to attract higher bids, as when, e.g., TRW, the automotive and defense
group, announced it would share “non-public information” with other companies,
including Northrop whose first bid it had rejected (Larsen and Nicoll 2002). Fact 2 we
interpret as the result of further news about z uncovered by continuing due diligence.
Overall, this evidence suggests that certification largely (but not fully) precedes the
first bid, and that successful certification is indeed necessary for a takeover deal to
succeed.
2.3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
For most parameter values of interest, equilibrium is unique and it is a separating
equilibrium in that targets are all of type z = 1.
Definition.–A separating equilibrium consists of three real numbers (x0, x1, q)
with x0 ≤ x1, for which (3), (4) and (5) hold.
Let xmin be the smallest and xmax the largest value of x in the support of F . If
the range of x is larger than c, such a separating equilibrium with a positive number
of takeovers will exist.
Proposition 2 (Only one Separating Equilibrium Exists). If (i) 0 < λ < 1,
(ii) c < xmax − xmin, and (iii) x has strictly positive density on [xmin, xmax] , then
takeovers occur and q ∈ (c, xmax) uniquely solves
λF (q − c) = (1− λ) (1− F [q]) . (9)
Proof. Eq’s (3), (4), and (5) imply (9). It remains to be shown that, for each λ and c,
(9) has a unique solution for q. This follows in 2 steps: By (i) and (ii), at q = xmax the
RHS of (9) is zero, whereas the left-hand side is strictly positive. At q = c the opposite
is true. By (iii) the LHS of (9) is continuous and strictly increasing in q whereas the
RHS is continuous and strictly decreasing. Hence, exactly one intersection exists.
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium. It plots the two sides of (9). The left-hand
side, λF (q − c) ≡ S (q) is the supply of targets forthcoming at the price q, while the
right-hand side, (1− λ) (1− F [q]) ≡ D (q), is the demand for targets at that price.
The equilibrium price, qE, is unique.
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Figure 4: Supply and Demand for Targets
The equilibrium that Figure 4 describes has every target disclosing, and there is
just one equilibrium of that type. When c is below a critical number, the separating
equilibrium is the only kind of equilibrium that can exist:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium is Unique). If
c < (1− λ)F−1
µ
1− λ
2− λ
¶
. (10)
no other equilibria exist.
Proof. Only z = 1 firms would ever disclose, and therefore for any x,
E (z | x, and no disclosure) ≤ λ. (11)
Suppose there exists a type of firm, call it xT that does not disclose a z = 1 project
for sure. That is, a fraction of the xT type firms does not disclose their good projects
and yet suppose that they are takeover targets. For a buyer of type x, expected
revenue from acquiring this target is E
¡
z | xT and no disclosure¢x. If, on the other
hand, firm xT were instead to disclose, it would yield revenue of x to that same buyer.
The additional expected revenue would, according to (11), be at least (1− λ)x. This
would exceed the cost of disclosure if
c < (1− λ)x. (12)
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To derive (10) we calculate a lower bound for x. We do so from the market-clearing
condition. Since x is a buyer, he cannot be below the lowest-quality buyer whom we
denote by xB. Then all x ≥ xB are also buyers since they have even more to gain
than xB from an acquisition. Thus the demand for targets is (1− λ)
£
1− F
¡
xB
¢¤
.
The supply of targets is at most F
¡
xB
¢
. Therefore F
¡
xB
¢
exceeds the demand for
targets, i.e.,
F
¡
xB
¢
≥ (1− λ)
£
1− F
¡
xB
¢¤
,
which implies that
xB ≥ F−1
µ
1− λ
2− λ
¶
,
i.e., (10).
Is (10) likely to hold in practice?–In condition (10) F−1
¡
1−λ
2−λ
¢
is the value of x
at the 1−λ
2−λ ’th percentile of the distribution of x. Since x exceeds the stage-1 capital-
ization, p (x) of the type-x firm, (10) is likely to hold unless λ is close to unity. Now,
from the target premium we estimated that λ ≈ 0.83 in which case (12) would read
c < (1− λ)xB ≈ (0.17)xB,
and xB exceeds the capitalization of the buyer.
Empirically, however, cxB seems to be much lower than that. Gray et al. (1990,
Table 1) report 33 indicators of project quality that firms disclose. New products,
major capital expenditures and major patents are some of the leading items. The
main component of c in this kind of disclosure is that the firm’s competitors may gain
from the knowledge. It is hard to measure directly, but we may infer the magnitude
of this component of c from M&A breakup fees which are put in place so as to deter
the bidder from stealing the idea. Those fees are about 3% of deal value (The Deal,
March 2, 2003, p. 38). Also, as noted above, due diligence normally takes place
privately which helps keep these indirect costs of disclosure small. As for more direct
components of c, advisory fees (what buyers pay for outside expertise) are only about
0.2 of a percent of deal size (The Deal February 17, 2003, p. 41). In terms of our
model, this would mean that a rough upper bound for c would be about 4% of deal
size.4 In other words, (10) would hold even if c were about three or four times larger
than it seems to be in practice.5
2.4 Welfare
Our welfare measure is net aggregate output, Y . If agents could not recontract
from the Stage-2 random assignment of z to x, aggregate output would be λµx ≡
4And, deal value is, as a rule, well below the capitalization of the buyer, which itself must be
below xB.
5Moreover, (10) is a suﬃcient condition only. In the case where F (x) is uniform on [xmin, xmax] ,
one can show that uniqueness is guaranteed if c < (1− λ)xmax, i.e., if c < (1− λ)F−1 (1). So,
uniqueness is guaranteed for any c if xmax is large enough.
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λ
R∞
0
xdF (x). With takeovers, however, output net of disclosure costs becomes
Y = λµx + (1− λ)
Z ∞
x1
xdF − λ
Z x0
0
(c+ x) dF. (13)
This is how much could be produced if, at a cost c, the planner could truthfully elicit
all the z = 1 projects from firms with x < x0, and reassign them to firms with x > x1.
It turns out that the equilibrium maximizes Y with respect to x0 and x1, subject to
the resource constraint
λF (x0) = (1− λ) [1− F (x1)] .
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Maximizes Y ). The equilibrium allocations maximize
Y. Moreover, when c ∈ (0, xmax − xmin) ,
dY
dc
= −λF (x0) < 0.
Proof. The Lagrangian is
L = Y + θ {λF (x0)− (1− λ) [1− F (x1)]} .
The first-order conditions are
− (c+ x0) + θ = 0,
and
−x1 + θ = 0.
The second-order derivatives with respect to x0 and x1 are negative and the cross
partials are zero. Therefore L is globally strictly concave in the vector (x0, x1) .
Combining the two conditions and observing that the constraint must hold proves
the first claim. The second claim then follows from the envelope theorem. The strict
inequality follows from Proposition 1 (eq. [9]) by which F (x0) > 0.
So, if the planner must pay c for every discovery of a z = 1 firm, then the
equilibrium also maximizes aggregate output net of disclosure costs, much as one
would expect based on Figure 4. In this sense, then, equilibrium is constrained
eﬃcient.
As c→ 0, x0 and x1 tend to the same value, call it x∗ which solves the equation
λF (x) = (1− λ) (1− F [x]) ,
Letting x∗ denote the optimum and simplifying,
F (x∗) = 1− λ. (14)
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so that the number of projects reassigned, λF (x∗) , is just λ (1− λ) . This is also
the first-best level of takeovers because this is what a planner could attain if he had
knowledge of the z’s without having to bear the disclosure costs.
The welfare properties of equilibrium seem to be unrelated to the change in the
joint total value of the bidder and the target (Proposition 2) — takeovers are always
associated with a level of output that exceeds λµx regardless of what δ (x) and J (x)
happen to be. This is because without aggregate risk, all future welfare gains from
reassignment are already included in p (x).
2.5 Other implications
Productivity-enhancement.–A takeover raises the joint output of the two firms by an
amount xA − xT where xA is the acquirer’s x and xT is the target’s x. This agrees
with findings by McGuckin and Ngyen (1995) and Schoar (2000) that the productivity
of the target’s plants rises (in this case from xT to xA) while that of the acquirer’s
plants falls (in this case from z to zero as the project is abandoned). Lichtenberg and
Siegel (1987), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2002)
all find that mergers raise productivity. Martin and McConnell (1991) find that the
likelihood of the target’s manager losing his job (about 10% in normal times) rises
by a factor of 4 or 5 after a takeover.
Acquisitions and Q.–Here, too, projects move from low-Q firms to high-Q firms.
By a firm’s Q we mean the ratio of the Stage-1 market value of the firm, p (x), to
the replacement value of its ‘capital’. Recall that a firm cannot replace its x, only
its z, and so we think of the firm’s tangible capital as its z — this is what a firm can
‘replace’. Let pz denote the Stage-1 replacement cost of an unscreened z. Then the
Stage-1 Q is defined as
Q (x) =
p (x)
pz
.
Since pz is common to all firms, we have
Proposition 5 Acquirers have higher Q’s than do the targets.
Proof. From (6), for x < x0, Q (x) = 1pzλ (q − c). But (6) and (4) imply that
Q (x1) = 1pzλq. That is, the lowest-Q acquirer has at least as high a Q as does any
target. And, since Q is strictly increasing in x for x > x1, the same is true for any
acquirer.
SinceQ is increasing in x, this translates into the statement that joint gains should
be higher and joint losses smaller for mergers in which QA − QT is high. Andrade
et al. (2001) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) find that acquisitions tend to be
made by high-Q firms. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) find that
the mergers that create the most value are those between high-Q bidders and low-Q
targets, which is consistent with Proposition 5.
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Comparative statics with respect to c, λ, and F .–The conditions of Proposition
2 provide clues to how the solution changes when the parameters change. Condition
(ii) requires that there be enough dispersion in the x’s. Condition (i) requires that
there be dispersion in the z’s; if all firms had the same-quality projects (which would
happen if λ = 0 or λ = 1), again there would be no takeovers. The equilibrium number
of takeovers is therefore non-monotonic in λ. Finally, takeover activity declines with
c. Formally, diﬀerentiation of (9) reveals that
∂q
∂λ
< 0 and
∂q
∂c
> 0. (15)
When λ is high, there are more good projects in total and the demand for targets
falls relative to their supply and, hence, so does q. On the other hand, when it costs
more to disclose quality, the price of targets will rise so as to reflect that fact. Eq’s
(4) and (15) imply that
∂x1
∂λ
< 0 and
∂x1
∂c
> 0, (16)
so that the number of takeovers, (1− λ) [1− F (x1)] decreases with c. Eq’s (3) and
(15) imply that
∂x0
∂λ
< 0, and
∂x0
∂c
< 0, (17)
this latter because we just established that the number of takeovers, which also equals
λF (x0), decreases with c.
These results match some empirical observations. (i) Bidders are in fact typically
larger than the targets. In our model, p (x) is increasing in x, and therefore the
stage-1 capitalization of buyers exceeds that of targets. (ii) Eq. (10) implies that
takeover activity rises as c falls or as the dispersion of x rises. The latter is measured
by the dispersion in Q. In the time series merger waves take place when the cross-
firm dispersion of Q is high (Figure 8 of Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002). (iii) Merger
waves tend to occur after industry deregulation or technological shock (Andrade et
al. 2001).
3 Discussion: Why takeovers, and not markets for
x or for z?
In the model takeovers allocate good projects to the best managers. But is there no
cheaper way to achieve this? The cost c may be small relative to q, but it is high in
absolute terms, and it is natural to ask if markets for managers or for project-rights
would not be a more eﬃcient way of accomplishing the same end result.
Markets for x.–A firm’s x may denote the quality of its entire management
team in which case it is costly to assemble from scratch, as Prescott and Visscher
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(1980) have stressed. In our model, however, it would be desirable for x to move,
if it could be done more cheaply than c. Managers do in fact move from firm to
firm, but hardly ever “en masse” as a team. There are two reasons for this. One is
the cost of coordinating any geographical move for all but the smallest management
teams. The other stems from the likelihood that members of the team will behave
non-cooperatively in bargaining with the new employer. The quality may be publicly
known, but the input of each member may be private information. In a similar
setting, Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that a team will not easily move to a
more profitable location, especially when the team is large. In a setting similar to
ours, Matsusaka (2001) views a firm as consisting of its organizational capabilities
transferable across products and industries. Gort, Grabowski, and McGuckin (1985)
show evidence that when management finds itself with spare capacity, it looks for
takeover targets instead of dispersing. Even without this team-capital eﬀect, it is
costly for a firm to let its managers go because they might take with them some
trade secrets. Non-compete clauses, deferred compensation, and non-vested inside
ownership stakes are all ways in which firms try to prevent their managers from
leaving. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) report that it is common for VCs to include
non-compete and vesting provisions that make it more expensive for the entrepreneur
to leave the firm. They document that non-compete clauses and vesting are common
in VC-backed ventures. In Table 2, they report non-compete clauses in 70% of the
cases and vesting of manager stock in 41% of the cases.
Markets for project-rights, z .–Team capital also hampers trade in project rights:
A project is worth more if some of the workers that developed it remain with the
project. E.g., bank A may wish to acquire bank B’s loan portfolio which fits well
with bank A’s products. Bank B’s loans are worth more if bank B’s loan oﬃcers
continue to oversee them. Bank B can therefore extract a higher price for its loans
if, instead of selling the loans alone, it invites a full-fledged takeover. This should
be especially true in human-capital intensive projects. Indeed, z can be thought of
as human capital or geographical location, while x is the organization capital. If by
human capital we mean client relationships, knowledge of the specific location and
project, etc. it helps explain why it has to be a firm and not a project acquisition.
A marketing division, a good brand image, a network of clients, all these cannot be
transferred without the sales people that developed them.
Examples of high z projects that were obtained through acquisition by firms with
high x.–Three recent examples are the acquisitions of IXnet by Global Crossing, of
IXC by Cincinnati Bell (now Broadwing) and of Teleport Communications Group
by AT&T. Each target had developed a new technology: IXnet developed Extranet,
a connectivity network that allowed financial firms to transmit data and voice in-
formation and to access financial data through a single connection. IXC was the
leading new generation fiber network carrier providing telecommunications services.
TCG owned TCG CERFnet, the award-winning unit of TCG dedicated to Internet
and data services. The acquirers, on the other hand, were firms with access to huge
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markets (Global Crossing) or with experience in developing and marketing bundled
services (Cincinnati Bell and AT&T), or what we call high x. More generally, it is
widely thought that Pfizer and Microsoft have consistently acquired promising young
businesses, essentially to get hold of their projects.
4 Conclusion
Takeovers are a large and growing part of economic activity, and one would hope
that they raise the profits of the firms involved in them and that they raise welfare
more generally. The prevalence of bidder discounts and, especially, of joint discounts,
has raised doubts that the takeover market works eﬃciently. The concern has been,
especially, that takeovers are driven by managerial empire building and the quest for
market power. This paper has proposed a competitive model in which takeovers are
eﬃcient, both privately and socially. The model has stressed the eﬃciency-enhancing
reallocative role of takeovers and shown that it is consistent with the prevalence of
bidder discounts and even of joint discounts.
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